

#229 GEORGE ELLIOTT: OPANA RADAR

Steven Haller (SH): My name is Steven Haller and I'm here with Harry Bukowski at the Waikiki Park Hotel in Honolulu, Hawaii. It's December 8, 1991, at 7:30 PM. We have the pleasure to be interviewing Mr. George Elliott. Mr. Elliott was a private assigned to Signal Company Aircraft Warning Hawaii stationed at Opana on that fateful day of December 7, 1941, at which time Mr. Elliott was twenty-two years of age. We are producing this tape for the *ARIZONA* Memorial and National Park Services oral history program, in conjunction with television station, KHET. And Mr. Elliott, I want to thank you very much for joining us today.

George Elliott (GE): Right.

SH: Let me ask you how you got into the Army and how it was that you ended up in the Signal Corps?

GE: Well, to start out with the very first draft that was in the early 1940. I believe they drew about 8,000 numbers and I think I was around 7,900, my number. So rather than wait three or four years to be drafted, I enlisted on November 12, 1940. And enlisted in the Air Corps -- that was a corps at that time. I spent almost a year at Hickam Field, because I enlisted for the Hawaiian department. And I was to become an airplane mechanic. However, most of my time was spent cutting grass and various other things like that were not -- I never really got a chance to be an airplane mechanic.

Well anyhow, about the early part of September of '41, a directive came out and it was posted on a bulletin board that they wanted men for the signal aircraft warning, the signal company aircraft warning. And I put in for an application for that. On the fifteenth of September of '41, I was assigned to the Signal Corps. It was the Signal Company Aircraft Warning Hawaii. And received most of my training at Schofield Barracks. And the training I received at the time was the plotting part of the radar operation.

SH: Was that at the control center at . . .

GE: Well, no, they had a practice that was . . .

SH: Information center . . .

GE: No, no it wasn't that, actually, information center. It was just at a practice center where they taught that particular thing. And I remember about a month before Pearl Harbor, they decided to move the portable unit, 270B, radar unit, to Opana. And that's what we did. We -- I, rather, helped assemble the unit for the operation that was put into effect roughly around near Thanksgiving. And we operated from four AM to seven AM, at that time.

On the morning of December 7, we were assigned on a problem -- we called it a problem. The problem would be picking up airplane targets on our oscilloscope and turning them over to the plotter so he could plot them and actually send them in to the information center. And the information center, of course, had the exact board that we had at our station at Opana. And there was a permanent painted board that we would use a tissue paper of some heavier tissue paper that was see-through, and on that we would plot what we would call our overlay. And we also had a record of reading sheets, so that for every

time that a target was picked up, the scope operator would give the mileage to the plotter. The plotter would have a radius from the center point, where the location of the radar unit at zero miles, and it would go out to 150 miles. And depending on what degree we picked up on the antenna, is where we set that particular rule. And at that point, at that mileage, we would make a dot on the overlay. And at the same time, we'd record it on record reading sheets, which consisted of the time, the azimuth, the mileage, and the Army coordinate system that they used at the time. And from that, the plotter would sum that into the information center, which was, in this case, was located at Fort Shafter and having the identical board that we had, on their table there, then the information center, they would be able to plot exactly at the same point that we picked the target up. And of course, above, in this information center at Fort Shafter, they had a balcony over this particular table and they would have officers from the Army, Air Corps, from the Navy, Marines, Coast Guard, and any other service that might be having any flights, in any particular area around Oahu. And if any one of those individual organizations could not identify one of their own flights, it was considered an enemy flight. And that is how they would determine at that time by the target they received, whether the plane was supposed to be there or whether it was not supposed to be there.

Harry Bukowski: George, you said the Opana site became operational around Thanksgiving?

GE: Yes.

HB: So you actually were there only two weeks before the attack. Could you tell us whether or not in your mind you perceived that there was a real threat to the Hawaiian islands at that time, or was this just something that you saw as a training exercise?

GE: No, it was just a training exercise to me. Personally, I didn't know anything that, insofar as the Japanese were concerned, there was anything out of it that they would be attacking Pearl Harbor. 'Cause at that time, it was peace time and people just thought, well, who would ever dare to attack Pearl Harbor? At least that was the impression I had and the only indication I had in my own personal knowledge of the upcoming December seventh attack.

HB: Was that the first time you met Private Lockard, when you went to the Opana site?

GE: Well, the --- yes, I had met him at the Schofield Barracks at the time that I was being instructed in the operation of plotting. You have the plotting, you have the main portion of it is the plotting and the scope operator that reads the target or when it is picked up.

SH: But when you were training with the plotting at Schofield Barracks -- and this was two weeks before Fort Shafter. But when you were training in plotting, was that on the 270B set at Schofield?

GE: Yes. That was the set that was actually moved out to Opana. And incidentally, it was a portable unit and it consisted of two large vans. One portion that was called a state body, that carried all the miscellaneous things, and there was another long antenna trailer, that drew the antenna of this trailer to the site up on the mountain.

HB: George, how many men would normally be assigned to the Opana site at this time, besides yourself and Joe Lockard? How many other Army personnel would be up there?

GE: I think we had somewhere around twelve or fourteen people at that time. Are you speaking of operation or . . .

HB: Well, I guess, you know, operating . . .

GE: Yeah.

HB: . . . this sort of thing, was on the site, or you operated the site on a rotating shift, I imagine.

GE: Yeah. There wasn't any other shift until December 7. And then of course, on December 7, we were assigned four hours on duty operating the radar unit. You're assigned four hours. The immediate next four hours, as guard duty, and the other four hours as rest, and then we went back on the four hour series, as I just explained.

HB: So you would operate from four to seven AM?

GE: Right.

HB: Guard from seven to eleven, and then you would rest from eleven to three?

GE: No. That was before Pearl. Yes, yes. Yeah, yeah.

HB: And then from four PM to seven PM, you would be on duty again?

GE: Right. Well, no, that wasn't exactly it, either. We had two men that were -- you see, our camp that we stayed at was nine miles away from Opana. Opana, you had to go up from the main highway, you had to go up through a sugar cane field to get to the mountain. And there was a very quickly built road to take all this equipment up to the top of the mountain, which was Opana. And I understand it was about 526 feet above sea level. But eventually, they did get the vans up there, but it was a difficult problem because the vans were very long, and especially to the antenna trailer. And there were very sudden drops down from the mountain that in building this road, that was pretty precarious operation to get all that equipment up there at the time.

HB: Could you tell us something more about the hours of operations? I never quite understood why you operated from four to seven. I assume that was because you were directed to operate.

GE: Well, yes, yes. It was --- that was our direction at the time. And just as hindsight on my part, they figured that any attack that might come in would be between the hours of four and seven.

HB: And did you operate in the afternoon at all, four to seven PM.

GE: Mainly -- before December 7?

HB: Before December 7.

GE: It was mainly just for practice purpose only that we did operate beyond the seven AM.

SH: Could you clarify more because you refer to your unit as having up to twelve people? And you said at the actual site, at Opana, you would have normally not that many people. Could you explain?

GE: Well, they were up there at the time the unit was being installed, but like on December 7, of course, it was just the two men, Lockard and I, that were there, operating at that four AM to seven.

SH: Was that the normal operating group?

GE: I believe it was, yes, at the time. It was peace time then. I believe that was, as I recall, that as the only time that we operated, was four AM to seven AM. That is officially where we would turn the information into the information center at Fort Shafter.

HB: Why don't you tell us about the events of that morning, on December 7?

GE: Well, we'll have to go back to December 6. At twelve noon on December 6, Lockard and I were assigned to relieve two men that continually guarded the unit, seven days a week, twenty-fours a day. And they were on to go on a twenty-four hour pass, which mean that from twelve noon of December 7, or December 6, through twelve noon of December 7, we were officially to be on duty. And however, in between that time, at four AM in the morning on Sunday, December 7, we were out to start this operation from four AM to seven. We had had, as I said earlier, I was a plotter, but I wanted to learn the operation of the scope. And we had had prearranged permission to operate beyond the seven AM period from our platoon sergeant, the late sergeant William Murphy, Jr. And at that particular time, we were instructed by the information center at Fort Shafter -- at least I was instructed over the tactical line, which is a direct line to the information center -- to shut down at 0654.

Now, at that time, as I say, I was to get prearranged -- we had prearranged permission for me to get further instruction on the scope. And Lockard, at that time, wanted to shut down, and go back on the air a little later that morning. And I insisted that we operate, and we did operate beyond the seven AM period. It was 7:02 AM that we picked up this flight that was 137 miles out at sea. Now, Lockard was looking over my shoulder, explaining the various targets that we might receive, the permanent echoes and the mileage indication, and the azimuth, and how to operate the antenna to zero in on a target and hold it so that you would be able to get a correct reading. And it was at this point that I say we picked up this flight at 137 miles. Now, to explain that, we had an oscillo-- we looked at what was on the oscilloscope, around the oscilloscope -- if you can only picture from the center point of the circle on the oscilloscope, with a white line that went from right to left, and general mileage would be indicated to the left. At the very far end of this white line would be indicating the mileage of 150 miles.

At this time, we picked up this flight at 137 miles and it appeared as though it was what they call a main pulse at the general mileage, is a pulse that's picked up by the mountains and everything else in between, at the proper location and radar unit. And that was actually a blind spot insofar as picking it up. And that usually was between fifteen and twenty-five miles, there was a

point there that you could not pick up the blips, or the targets. And as I say, at this flight that we picked up that joining, it appeared as though it was a main pulse at 137 miles. And Joe figured there was something wrong with the set. So he took over the operation of the set, and found that it was not a malfunction of the set, that it was actually a flight that was coming in. So I went to the plotting board and got the mileage from Joe Lockard at 132 miles at that time. And plotted it at 7:02, at 132 miles.

Now, originally I said we shut down at 6:54. This shutting down at 6:54 had no bearing whatsoever on the time element of the picking up of the enemy flight, unknown enemy flight. Put it that way.

And . . . I just had a lapse of . . .

HB: Okay, you were tracking a flight that's coming in at 7:02.

GE: Yeah. Oh, at this particular time, when we picked up the first target at 132 miles at 7:02, there again I suggested to Lockard that we send it into our information center. And of course, Lockard said no, and just laughed at me and said -- called me crazy for wanting to send it in, that our problem was over at seven o'clock. Well, I kept talking to Lockard about it, and I even decided that it was the Army sending up planes to intercept Navy planes, that it would make a good problem. And finally, Lockard said to me, "Well, go ahead and send it in if you like."

So of course, I tried the tactical line, which was the direct line from our plotting board to the information center plotting board, and it was dead because everybody had gone home at 6:54. And then I went to the administrative line. The administrative line, I had to call through our camp to be patched through to Fort Shafter. At this time, I picked up the switchboard operator, Joseph McDonald, at the information center at Fort Shafter, and explained to him what we had found. And Joe says, "Well," Joe McDonald said, "well, there's nobody here."

And I asked him, I said, "Well, if you get somebody, have him call us back at Opana."

Well, the call came back to Opana and Lockard sitting nearest the phone picked up the phone and spoke with the officer that said that. After Lockard explained to him, he said, in essence, to forget it. Now of course, everybody knows that after this was done -- this, we didn't know on December 7, but he, Lieutenant Tyler knew that a flight of our planes was coming into reinforce Hawaii. I believe they were coming in from March Field, California. But in defense of Lieutenant Tyler, he had only been at the operation at the information center on one occasion, on an officer orientation tour. This particular morning on December 7, he was assigned from four AM to seven, pardon me, to eight AM, an hour beyond the original assignment of all the other men. So as I gave the information to McDonald, he wrote the message down, he turned around to look at the plot to see what time the mark, the message, and he saw that this Lieutenant Tyler was there. And Lieutenant Tyler, of course, was there only officially as an observer of the information center operation, at that time. And he had learned during that four-hour time that he was there, that a flight of our planes was coming in to reinforce Hawaii. And that is what he figured that the targets that we turned into them was. And that is how nothing was actually done about the information that we had sent in.

HB: George, if I may interrupt here. Did you have any radar contact before seven AM, or was that the first big contact, the first contact of the morning?

GE: I testified to the Army and the Navy, and also the Senate investigating committee that as far as I can remember, we had no targets.

HB: Okay, if you remember when I visited you in New Jersey, you showed me the radar plot that you made that morning. You were actually doing the plotting and Lockard was operating the scope, I understand. And that plot you had at the top coming down to Oahu, that is the incoming flight of the Japanese planes?

GE: From 7:02, yes.

HB: Seven-oh-two in the morning.

GE: That from 6:45, or whatever it was, earlier, that mark on there.

HB: You remember that material you showed me, you showed me the handwritten record reporting that same information on December seventh, was . . .

GE: Right.

HB: . . . with general emergency matrix.

GE: All right.

HB: Can you just explain that to me?

GE: Yeah, to explain that, it was peace time and we were more interested in marking down the targets and keeping a record of reading of that than we were the date that they were even seen. I mean, the point is that the record of reading sheet that was used that morning on the seventh of December was also probably used for either December 6, or even before that.

HB: Okay, so what you're saying is that those plots on there before seven AM do not correctly belong on December 7?

GE: As far as I will testify to my own knowledge, if anybody, even a novice, and I'm not a handwriting expert, can tell that the date was put in on the 12-7-41, the two in particular had a big loop at the bottom. My twos did not have a loop. They were just straight line across on the bottom. And . . .

HB: Okay, so what you're saying is that you actually wrote that, but you did not write in the date.

GE: That's right. The date was not in there on December 7. And the plots that were shown on there, as far as I'm concerned, were from a previous date, where we had not dated the record reading sheets. Now, same way with the overlay that we had. We don't know just how old that had been on there, how long that had been on there. We have to remember, this was peace time, and we were there for practice and true, maybe it should have been dated properly, but it just wasn't used. And then, the early morning targets that were marked on

the record of reading sheets, probably, as I say, were put there sometime before that.

HB: Colonel Tetley tells me that the guys in the company, he understands, had a pool in which they had bet on what morning the Japanese would attack. Do you know anything about that, sir?

GE: I know nothing about that, no. No, I'll be very candid with you. Had I known or had any idea that those were enemy planes coming in, I certainly wouldn't have stopped with a second lieutenant. I would have found one way to go over his head and get somebody with a higher authority to report it to. But we -- the point is that we were so proud of the reading that we had received, because we had never received a reading like that before, though. The most reading that we had received on the oscilloscope was maybe about a half-inch blip, half-inch high. This particular target that we had on December 7 was almost a quarter of an inch wide and one up over above the top of the oscilloscope.

HB: So it was unlike anything you'd seen before?

GE: Right. And we were very proud of it. As a matter of fact, we took the record of reading sheets back with us, when we went to Kawaialoa, where our camp was. Now I had explained there again, that the two men that we relieved were twenty-four hour pass, and we were officially never to be relieved until twelve noon on December 7. They came back early. And we went to our breakfast early and in all the official reports, they referred to it as a breakfast truck. Well, it was not a breakfast truck because we weren't to be relieved until twelve noon. The only reason that we went back to breakfast was because we were relieved early. And as a matter of fact, we got to breakfast and we had a container of flapjacks that were going to be sent out to us at the normal time when they came back early from pass. And we never did eat.

HB: George, okay, George, I understand that on the morning of December 7, you plotted the incoming Japanese planes at 7:45 and you then shut down the radar at Opana.

GE: Yeah, the very last reading actually was at 7:43. And the reason we shut down at 7:43 was because we had hit this portion I was flying earlier of the fifteen to twenty-five mile -- we could not pick up the flight. Now, what happened was that those planes were coming in. They saw they were coming directly -- would go directly over our head, and after we had shut down, we went out to look at the sky and try to see the planes, but we saw nothing. Because what happened, apparently, between that fifteen and twenty-five mile limit, they had dispersed and one went to the left, and one went to the right. And it's my own theory, and I don't know for sure, but I think that one went around and hit Kaneohe Bay, and the other came around and hit Pearl Harbor. And then of course, the additional flights that came in added to the attack that may have come in through the overhead, and looked over Hawaii. I mean, Oahu.

HB: When did you actually know that Pearl Harbor was under attack?

GE: There again, we, as I say we had this very precarious road to go down the mountain. I think it took us at least fifteen minutes to get down the mountain. Then after we got down the mountain, we got to the Hawaii that was

still eight miles to Kawaialoa, to our camp. And incidentally, they had another radar station at that point, that was on beach level. Our operation at Opana was much greater brains because of our height of the antenna, to shun the signal out. And on the way back to our camp at Kawaialoa, we noticed that a bunch of men in the old World War I Army helmets were on their way to where we had come from. They were on -- in other words, they were on their way to the unit at Opana. And we had no indication, other than the fact that we saw the truckload of men going up there, and of course, they didn't stop, even though we waved to 'em. We continued on to Kawaialoa. And we arrived at Kawaialoa and found out that that was, that at five minutes to eight, they had started to attack Pearl Harbor.

I would imagine we arrived at Kawaialoa at 8:15. And the --- immediately, we went right back to, after finding out of the attack. Incidentally, we were so proud, as I said before, of the readings and the mileage that we had picked the unknown enemy flight up, that we took the record of reading sheets along with us, to show the other fellows at the other unit, of the flight that we had picked up.

HB: George, at 8:15, did you and Joe Lockard realize immediately what you had done, that you had . . .

GE: Oh yes.

HB: . . . the incoming Japanese . . .

GE: Oh yes.

HB: No doubt in your mind.

GE: There was no doubt in our mind that that's what it was.

HB: At 8:15, you two were in possession of some very important information. You knew where the Japanese carriers were.

GE: That's right.

HB: Did you realize the significance of that?

GE: I really don't know. Well, no, after we never --- at least I didn't. And I didn't associate the other fact of aircraft carriers being at that point. But we did leave the record of reading sheets with one of the officers there. And there is a little doubt that Lockard says it was a Lieutenant Caceres, and I say it was a Lieutenant John Upson. But there again, the record of reading sheet was left there at that station, with an officer.

HB: When you returned thereupon I imagine that the station was back in operation.

GE: Oh yes. The men that went out earlier had started operations.

HB: It was at that point, did you track the Japanese planes going back to their aircraft carriers?

GE: No, no. I didn't, when I got back there -- and incidentally, when I mentioned about the breakfast truck, when I got to Kawaialoa, the breakfast that we were to have was in the container that was going to be originally taken out to us, but they kept it there for us 'cause they knew we were coming back. We took the container back with us to Opana and we opened up and saw it was flapjacks and they were all cold, so we didn't even bother to eat 'em at all. So we had no breakfast that morning.

But to get to the operation, I didn't do any more operation on the radar unit at that time. I was busy digging the temporary latrine trenches, so to speak.

HB: Let me rephrase that, on that radar plot that you showed me, it looks like somebody plotted the return of the Japanese planes, to their aircraft carrier. Do you have any knowledge of that?

GE: No.

HB: That function . . .

GE: No. Everything was so jumbled up that the targets that the men, whoever they were -- I don't even know who they were at the time -- that took over the operation on December 7, and started a new record of reading sheets. They used, as far as I can see, they used the same overlay that was on there, on December 7. And flights were all jumbled up because they were attacking. They were attacking. They didn't go back in formation as they came in, I'm sure. And I don't believe that any of the -- there may have been some flights that were marked as going out, but I had seen the overlay after December 7 operation, and that overlay is so jumbled up that you could hardly decipher when and where and time that those plots were made.

HB: George, it is now fifty years after the event of that momentous day. Can you just tell us how the events of that morning have impacted your life and your feelings about the events of that morning looking back from this point of view, fifty years later?

GE: Well, for me to really answer that, it would take me a lot more time than I think I'm allowed. But . . .

HB: But maybe you could encapsulate.

GE: All right. Well, let me put in a nutshell then.

HB: That's great.

GE: When the draft --- when President Roosevelt, around December 18, 1941, appointed the Roberts Commission to go over and investigate the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor. When the Roberts report was made public, at the time of the early portion of the war, it was stated in that report that a non-commissioned officer had picked up the enemy flight, wanting further instructions on the operation of the scope, had received permission to do so and the -- even the wording in the official document, it said to do so, he was granted leave to do so, to operate beyond the seven AM period. And that he had picked them up and sent them in. Now, of course, insofar as I was concerned, I know that there was two men. That there wasn't one man.

So the Roberts Committee official report, it said one man, a non-commissioned officer, it was not true. I mean, it was erroneous, because there were two men. There was Lockard and Elliott that picked up the flight from Opana. And from that point on, it was considered that one man picked 'em up. Now, when I testified before the Army board of inquiry, and the Navy court of inquiry in 1944, was the first time that there was indication that there was two men that picked up the enemy flight. Nothing was ever said in any of the further reports of investigation to Pearl Harbor that the original report by the Roberts Committee was erroneous. They just assumed there were two men, but actually, publicly, it wasn't notified until November, I mean until 1946, when I testified before the Senate investigating committee. And incidentally, Senator Alvin Barkley was chairman of that committee. When I finished testifying, he -- you can cut this, I'm sure. He asked me if I had received a medal for my part on December 7. And I told him, "No, I had not," and that I had received a commendation from the three ranking generals of the Hawaiian department.

Apparently, Senator Barkley went to the War Department and recommended me for a medal. In August of '46, I was awarded by order the Legion of Merit. The Legion of Merit is one below the Distinguished Service Medal that Lockard received. And as a matter of principle, I wrote to the War Department that I would not accept any lesser medal than Lockard had received. And as a result, I can pick up the Legion of Merit any time I want, because they would not rescind the order, but they would indicate on my service record that I declined to accept the medal. And that pretty much . . .

HB: Any further questions, or any further comments?

SH: What I'd like to do is make sure you have a few minutes on this tape to take a look at the documents that we have, and we do have what you were referring to, the radar plot. Apparently, it must be different from what you were referring to as the record of reading, which you . . .

GE: Well, now, they agree.

SH: . . . turned into the officer that . . .

GE: There is no difference. The record of reading sheets, you can take any overlay and duplicate that plot. Now, one other thing that I didn't mention . . .

SH: (Inaudible)

GE: Well, let me try to explain. On the --- also, one of the very last questions that Senator Barkley asked me was would I like a copy of my testimony? And I told him, "Yes sir, I would."

About four months later, the mail truck pulled up in front of my house with two big bags of mail. And I had every volume -- I have thirty-nine volumes -- and I still have them in my possession -- of every word that has been testified to -- whether it's the Roberts[Commission]Committee, the Hart[Inquiry] Committee, the Clausen [Investigation] Committee, the Hewitt [Investigation] Committee, the Army [Pearl Harbor Board]Committee, the Navy [Court of Inquiry]Committee, and the Senate [Joint Congressional] committee

[Investigation]. I have every word officially that has been testified by any individual on Pearl Harbor. And that is where I received the record that I'm showing at this point here.

HB: The radar plot in your possession contains the same information?

GE: That is right.

HB: Okay.

GE: However, on the overlay, you will find that there are a lot of plots on the overlay that are not on the record of reading sheets that are the official record of reading sheets. Because they were plotted as the attack was going on and after the Japanese had struck Pearl Harbor. So that is the reason that I do have an official document that -- and incidentally, we got -- what you have is only a portion of the original document, but it shows the individual flight coming in, was where Pearl Harbor . . .

HB: Thank you, George. We appreciate you coming here today to review this event with us.

GE: Yeah.

SH: Thanks George.

GE: So kind.

SH: I assume that's also a half-hour tape.

(Conversation off-mike)

(Taping stops, then resumes)

HB: Okay, we're looking at the official radar plot of the Opana radar site, that was supplied to us by George Elliott, which we discussed on the previous tape. If you look at the top, you see where George Elliott marked the incoming Japanese flight at 7:02 in the morning and then continuing on down, at various times, 7:05, 7:08, down toward the island of Oahu, until it was lost in the background scatter, at 7:39. Now, at that time, I understand George shut down the radar operation, so that when he came back and other people were operating and say they were recording these other plots.

GE: That's right.

HB: You did record these.

GE: No.

HB: Now, were you on duty the previous morning, George, on December the sixth.

GE: I don't remember. I really don't.

HB: Okay, but you were on duty this morning. Now, this item that you supplied to us, George, contains the same information written down showing the

azimuth and the distance, and the flight, down to 7:43. We notice on here some times before seven, and you maintain that was recorded the previous day.

GE: Yeah, or even before that. Either, it could possibly have been before that.

HB: Could it have been a day or two before that?

GE: In other words, this reading at 7:02, that's -- if you read 7:02 here, you'll find that is, at this portion of the clutter, is really here, 7:02 is shown clear and (mumbles) and so forth.

HB: Is this your handwriting? Is this your handwriting, George?

GE: On every bit of that, every bit of that is my handwriting, yes.

HB: Inside, after 7:02 or even before 7:02?

GE: It's after 7:02, but it could be before 7:02 at another date. The only thing that I feel is wrong, the date that was filled in here, it had to be blank at the time that all these readings of 7:02 were put in. That, if you would look at the two, you will see there's a big loop on the two. And any two here on this whole plot, you will not see that kind of two.

HB: So that's not your handwriting?

GE: Yes, this is not my handwriting.

HB: You think that was done by Colonel Murphy?

GE: Right. And also, you will find the seven has a slash, and the fours, that they are more or less, they're not straight, like they are.

HB: All right. We're going to leave a copy of this material with the record that will be kept with the videotape for future reference. Thank you very much, George.

GE: Okay, thank you.

END OF INTERVIEW